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A B S T R A C T   
In Europe, the ongoing renewable expansion and delays in the planned grid extension have intensified the 
discussion about an adequate electricity market design. Against this background, we jointly apply an agent-based 
electricity market model and an optimal power flow model to investigate the long-term impacts of splitting the 
German market area into two price zones. Our approach allows capturing long-term investment and short-term 
market behavior under imperfect information. We find strong impacts of a German market splitting on electricity 
prices, expansion planning of generators and required congestion management. While the congestion volumes 
decrease significantly under a market split in the short term, the optimal zonal configuration for 2020 becomes 
outdated over time due to dynamic effects like grid extension, renewable expansion and new power plant in-
vestments. Policymakers and regulators should therefore regularly re-assess bidding zone configurations. Yet, 
this stands in contrast to the major objective of price zones to create stable locational investment incentives.   
1. Introduction 
Driven by the massive expansion of renewable electricity generation 
as well as political phase-out decisions of technologies such as nuclear or 
coal-fired generation, the design of the European electricity markets is in 
a state of constant evolution. An aspect of particular relevance in this 
respect is the design of the day-ahead markets and the closely related 
congestion management. Currently, following the concept of zonal 
pricing, the day-ahead market clearing of the interconnected European 
electricity system is carried out without considering any grid constraints 
within a price zone, which in most cases corresponds to a whole country. 
Only in a subsequent step, congestion management measures, such as 
redispatching and curtailment of generation from renewable energy 
sources (RES), are used if the market outcome is not realizable due to 
intra-zonal congestion. Due to recent and upcoming trends, congestion 
management becomes increasingly important in Germany:  
• Large generation capacities, mainly located in Southern Germany, 
are dropping out of the market until 2022 due to the political deci-
sion of phasing-out nuclear power. Moreover, the German Kommis-
sion für Wachstum, Strukturwandel und Beschäftigung (commonly 
called Kohlekommission) has recently agreed on a phase-out of coal- 
fired generation until 2038, which will particularly affect regions 
in the West (Rhineland) and East (Lusatia, Central German district) 
of the country (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 
2019).  
• Electricity generation from wind power has increased significantly 
over the past years and is expected to continue to do so. However, 
these generation capacities are to a large extent located in Northern 
Germany. 
• Low wholesale electricity prices provide poor incentives for in-
vestments in additional conventional generation capacity or utility- 
scale storage units.  
• While these developments result in a shift of generation capacity to 
Northern Germany, the industrial load centers with a rather inflex-
ible demand structure are mainly located in Western and Southern 
Germany. In the past years, this locational mismatch between gen-
eration and consumption has already led to an increasing number of 
hours where the market result had to be corrected by redispatching 
and curtailment of RES (Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt, 
2019). Moreover, Poland and the Czech Republic have already 
installed phase shifters to reduce loop flows from Northern Germany 
to Southern Germany through their domestic grid.  
• Although new high-voltage direct current (HVDC) lines are supposed 
to solve these issues to a large extent, their completion is likely to be 
delayed by a few years. 
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Apart from resulting in additional costs for congestion management, 
these trends might also endanger security of supply in (Southern) Ger-
many in the upcoming years. Regional price signals could help to 
counteract these risks by incentivizing investments in generation ca-
pacity or avoiding decommissioning of further power plants by 
adequately indicating regional scarcity. 
In this context, nodal pricing is often considered to be the theoreti-
cally first best solution as prices in this market design directly reflect not 
only marginal generation costs but also bottleneck costs (Stoft, 1997). 
This concept is currently for instance used in the PJM market area of the 
USA and in New Zealand (Pettersen et al., 2011). However, a short-term 
implementation of nodal pricing in Germany or even Europe is unlikely 
(Trepper et al., 2015). 
Alternatively, country price zones can be split up into multiple zones, 
such as those in the Nordic electricity market (Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark) (THEMA Consulting Group, 2013), resulting in 
diverging electricity prices and therefore regional investment in-
centives. With regard to Germany, this solution might be quicker and 
easier to implement than a nodal pricing approach. However, the cur-
rent German government is strongly in favor of staying with a single 
German price zone and has recently even changed the legislation 
(Stromnetzzugangsverordnung – StromNZV) accordingly (Bundesministe-
rium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017). Nevertheless, the topic remains 
highly relevant not only from an academic and political perspective, but 
also for generation companies and grid operators. 
While the short-term impacts of dividing the German price zone have 
already been extensively analyzed by different authors (Burstedde, 
2012; Breuer et al., 2013; Breuer and Moser, 2014; Trepper et al., 2015; 
Egerer et al., 2016; Plancke et al., 2016), the only investigations of the 
long-term impacts to date have been carried out by Grimm et al. (2016a, 
b, 2017, 2018) and Ambrosius et al. (2019). Yet, as Grimm et al. (2016b) 
point out, the consideration of these long-term effects is an essential 
aspect for the political discussion on concrete splitting of zones. 
Against this background, we use an innovative modeling framework 
consisting of an agent-based electricity market simulation model 
(PowerACE) and an optimal power flow model (ELMOD) to investigate 
the long-term impacts of splitting the German price zone. Contrary to 
the method used in Ambrosius et al. (2019), this new approach allows to 
consider multiple time periods with regard to generation and storage 
expansion planning and is therefore able to capture the real-world 
long-term dynamics appropriately. 
Our results focus on the German day-ahead market, required 
congestion management measures as well as associated system costs and 
distributional effects under a zonal split as compared to the status quo of 
a single German price zone. Despite the explicit focus on Germany, the 
obtained results are also relevant for other regions using multiple price 
zones within a country, such as the Nordic electricity market or Italy. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we 
briefly review the relevant literature and derive the research gap our 
paper aims to fill. Section 3 introduces the proposed modeling frame-
work and explains important methodological aspects in details. We then 
describe the most relevant input data as well as the scenario definition in 
Section 4. In Section 5, we present possible long-term impacts of split-
ting the German price zone. Ultimately, Section 6 provides a summary 
and an outlook on future work. 
2. Literature review and research gap 
In the following, an overview of the previous literature relevant for 
this article is provided. Firstly, we briefly review existing methods for 
bidding zone delimination. Secondly, the focus is set on the short-term 
impacts of reconfiguring the European price zones and splitting the 
German price zone in particular. Thirdly, we summarize literature on 
the long-term impacts of such market design changes. Ultimately, we 
outline the research gap that this paper aims to fill. 
Nomenclature 
Parameters 
Δt time step length [h] 
η efficiency [MWhel /MWhth] 
cvar average variable costs [EUR/MWhel] 
cadd specific costs of artificial load [EUR/MWhel] 
ccurt specific costs of curtailment [EUR/MWhel] 
cO&M operation and maintenance costs [EUR/MWhel] 
cvar,max maximum variable costs [EUR/MWhel] 
cvar,rev reverted variable costs [EUR/MWhel] 
cvar variable costs [EUR/MWhel] 
cvoll specific costs of lost load [EUR/MWhel] 
efuel emission factor [tCO2 /MWhth] 
lgross gross load [MWhel] 
lnet net/residual load [MWhel] 
pCO2 CO2 price [EUR/tCO2 ] 
pfuel fuel price [EUR/MWhth] 
Sets and Indices 
e transmission line 
h hour 
hoff offline hour 
hon online hour 
m market area 
n grid node 
p power plant 
pcon conventional power plant 
pren renewable power plant 




Δp relative day-ahead price difference [–] 
Δpsorted sorted day-ahead price difference [EUR/MWhel] 
λ locational marginal price [EUR/MWhel ] 
p average day-ahead price [EUR/MWhel] 
b bid price [EUR/MWhel ] 
bmin bid price for minimal load [EUR/MWhel] 
brest bid price for rest load [EUR/MWhel] 
Ccong total costs of congestion management [EUR] 
Ccurt total costs of curtailment [EUR] 
Cinf total infeasibility costs [EUR] 
Credisp total costs of redispatching [EUR] 
cstart specific start up costs [EUR/MWel] 
fAC net flow AC [MWhel] 
fDC net flow DC [MWhel] 
g electricity generation [MWhel] 
gmarket market-dispatched electricity generation [MWhel] 
ladd artificially added load [MWhel] 
lcharge storage charging demand [MWhel] 
ldump dumped load [MWhel] 
toff offline time [h] 
ton online time [h]  
C. Fraunholz et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Energy Policy 149 (2021) 111833
3
Regarding the bidding zone configuration method, four main ap-
proaches can be distinguished. Firstly, the zonal delimination is based 
on historical real-world grid congestion (Egerer et al., 2016; Plancke 
et al., 2016). Secondly, splitting a price zone can be conducted along the 
main bottlenecks of the transmission grid for a future reference year 
(Trepper et al., 2015). Thirdly, nodal electricity prices are clustered, e. 
g., by using genetic algorithms (Breuer et al., 2013; Breuer and Moser, 
2014). Fourthly, a new bidding zone configuration is determined 
model-endogenously (Grimm et al., 2017; Ambrosius et al., 2019). In the 
paper at hand, we assume the regulator to base his decision on the di-
vision of the German price zone on knowledge available to him at the 
time of decision-making. For this reason, nodal prices of the year 2020 
are clustered using a fuzzy c-means algorithm, rather than applying a 
model-endogenous approach (see Section 3). 
Reconfiguring European bidding zones brings along a number of 
short-term impacts, which have already been extensively analyzed in 
several studies to date. The relevant contributions are shortly presented 
in the next paragraphs. 
Burstedde (2012) compares a nodal pricing approach and a zonal 
configuration based on the clustering of nodal prices on a European level 
for the scenario years 2015 and 2020. Both variants are then contrasted 
with the current situation of nationwide price zones in terms of gener-
ation and redispatching costs. While the costs of redispatching are 
significantly reduced when the current zones are reconfigured and even 
more so under the nodal pricing approach, the rise of generation costs 
almost entirely compensates this effect. 
Breuer et al. (2013) and Breuer and Moser (2014) apply genetic al-
gorithms for the scenario years 2016 and 2018 in order to deduce an 
optimal zonal configuration on a European level from nodal prices. They 
investigate different numbers of zones and ultimately conclude that 
reconfiguring the European price zones into 10 to 15 new zones, the 
costs of redispatching would decrease more than the costs of generation 
would rise as compared to the reference case. However, also in these 
studies, the savings are very low in relation to the total traded electricity 
volume. 
Trepper et al. (2015) investigate a splitting of the German price zone 
based on the most heavily congested lines for the scenario year 2020. 
With trading capacities of 10.2–15.3 GW, the redispatching volumes 
decrease significantly and average price differences of 1.55–3.56 
EUR/MWhel between the two new zones occur. Moreover, the authors 
find decreasing producer rents and increasing consumer rents in 
Northern Germany, while the opposite is true for Southern Germany. 
Egerer et al. (2016) analyze a splitting of the German price zone for 
the years 2012 and 2015 without taking into account the German 
neighboring countries. With a trading capacity of 8 GW, only small 
average price differences of 0.40 EUR/MWhel (2012) and 1.70 
EUR/MWhel (2015) between the two German zones arise. Redispatching 
volumes decrease slightly in 2012 and more significantly in 2015. 
Plancke et al. (2016) apply a European spot market model to a 
scenario for the year 2020 and examine the European impact of a 
splitting of the German price zone. Assuming a trading capacity of 8 GW, 
the average price differences between the two zones amount to 5.16 
EUR/MWhel. While the greatest changes in consumer rents and producer 
rents can be observed in Germany, to a lesser extent, many neighboring 
countries are also affected. Since the authors don’t use an additional grid 
model, no analyses on the changes in redispatching volumes and costs 
are carried out. 
All of the studies mentioned so far focus on the static short-term 
perspective without taking into account dynamic long-term aspects, 
such as the impact on investments in new generation capacity. The 
literature tackling these particular issues, as presented in the following, 
is substantially less extensive to date. 
Applying an integrated generation investment, spot market and 
redispatching model to a small-scale test network, Grimm et al. (2016b) 
provide a theoretical analysis of potential long-term welfare effects of 
splitting up price zones under consideration of investment behavior. In 
their work, they explicitly point out that for the political discussion 
regarding concrete splitting of zones, the consideration of such 
long-term impacts is essential for decision making. 
This aspect is further investigated in a number of additional 
contributions (Grimm et al., 2016a, 2017; 2018; Ambrosius et al., 2019), 
all of which apply multilevel equilibrium models considering both the 
electricity market and the electrical grid. 
In Grimm et al. (2016a), a model with decision levels for line 
expansion, generation capacity expansion and spot market including 
redispatching is introduced, formally analyzed and applied to a 
small-scale case study. Grimm et al. (2018) then extend this model and 
investigate different market design changes including market splitting 
for a strongly simplified representation of the German electricity system 
and a single future year (2035). The division of the German price zone is 
conducted in a simplified fashion along the borders of some German 
federal states. The authors find that the locational price signals 
occurring under market splitting induce a more efficient allocation of 
conventional power plants. This, in turn, reduces the need for grid 
expansion. Moreover, the choice of appropriate transfer capacities 
between the two German zones proves to be crucial. 
The first decision level of Grimm et al. (2016a) is modified in Grimm 
et al. (2017) in order to model-endogenously derive an optimal 
specification of price zones instead of deciding on line investments. 
While Grimm et al. (2017) focus on solution algorithms and 
highly-aggregated test cases, Ambrosius et al. (2019) use an again 
slightly modified version of this model to derive an optimal delimination 
of the German price zone under consideration of anticipated generation 
capacity expansion as well as spot market trading and redispatching. A 
novelty of this contribution is the model-endogenous determination of 
the transfer capacities between the different German price zones. The 
extended model is applied to a strongly simplified representation of the 
German electricity system in a single future year (2035). Ambrosius 
et al. (2019) find that under two or three price zones in Germany, the 
major part of the theoretically achievable welfare gains is already 
realized, while increasing the amount of zones further brings little 
additional benefit. 
The above-mentioned contributions are the first in the literature to 
present important insights in potential long-term impacts of splitting the 
German price zone in two or multiple zones. Yet, despite modeling 
different decision levels, Ambrosius et al. (2019) assume perfect 
anticipation of the regulator in terms of generation expansion planning, 
spot market trading and redispatching. Moreover, the long-term effects 
of splitting the German price zones are only analyzed for a single future 
year and under strong simplifications, particularly in terms of grid 
resolution. We therefore propose an alternative modeling framework, 
which extends the work of Ambrosius et al. (2019) in three important 
aspects. 
Firstly, in our approach, the regulator decides on an optimal 
delimination of the German price zone prior to the decisions of the 
companies on investments in new generation and storage units, 
i.e., under imperfect information. In a real-world setting, this is exactly 
the situation a regulator would be confronted with when deciding on a 
new price zone configuration. Not having any information on the 
reactions of the generation companies, he could only base his decision 
on information available to date. 
Secondly, our proposed modeling framework includes an agent- 
based multi-period simulation covering 2020 through 2050 as well as 
Germany and all neighboring countries. This approach allows to capture 
long-term investment and short-term market behavior under imperfect 
information while adequately accounting for both intertemporal effects 
and cross-border effects. 
Thirdly, the applied optimal power flow model considers the entire 
German transmission grid and auxiliary nodes in the neighboring 
countries rather than using a strongly simplified representation of the 
grid. Therefore, cross-border effects in terms of required congestion 
management measures and persistent intra-zonal congestion can also be 
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considered. 
For these reasons, the novel approach presented in the following is 
very well suited to capture dynamic long-term impacts of a zonal split in 
Germany in a closer-to-real-world fashion than any other publication 
available to date. 
3. Methodology 
Any approach that aims to investigate all relevant long-term aspects 
of a zonal split in Germany needs to cover the decisions of different 
actors. Firstly, a regulator deciding on the actual zonal split, secondly, 
the long-term investment and short-term market decisions of the 
different generation firms, and thirdly, the required congestion man-
agement measures carried out by the transmission system operator 
(TSO). 
We tackle this challenge by jointly applying two established energy- 
related models, namely the optimal power flow model ELMOD and the 
electricity market simulation model PowerACE. In Section 3.1, we 
describe the interaction of the two models and outline the advantages of 
our modeling framework. Sections 3.2–3.5 then explain in detail, how 
the different decision levels are modeled in ELMOD and PowerACE. 
3.1. Overview of the modeling framework 
The timeline of the different decision levels in the combined appli-
cation of ELMOD and PowerACE is presented in Fig. 1. In order to 
outline the differences between our modeling approach and that of 
Ambrosius et al. (2019), we use the same style for our illustration as they 
do. 
In a first step (bottom-left box), the regulator decides on an optimal 
splitting of the German price zone and corresponding transfer capacities. 
For this purpose, hourly nodal prices that are simulated with ELMOD for 
the base year 2020 are clustered in two zones (see Section 3.2 for 
details). Contrary to Ambrosius et al. (2019), the zonal delimitation is 
independent of the subsequent decisions on expansion planning and (re) 
dispatch, since a regulator wouldn’t have a priori knowledge on these 
decisions in a real-world setting. 
Next, |Y| periods are simulated, each denoting one year at hourly 
resolution. For each period, the simulation covers three steps. Firstly, 
using the information on the new zonal delimination, the day-ahead 
market is simulated with PowerACE (for details see Section 3.3). 
Secondly, the hourly dispatch originating from the market simulation 
serves as input to determine required congestion management measures 
with ELMOD (for details see Section 3.4). These two steps correspond to 
the top-right box in Fig. 1. Thirdly, the different companies create their 
individual generation and storage expansion plan for the subsequent 
periods (bottom-right box). Contrary to Ambrosius et al. (2019), these 
decisions are not directly related to the (re)dispatch of the following 
periods, but the companies rather prepare future price forecasts and 
generate their expansion plans accordingly. This approach is again 
closer to a real-world setting, since real companies only have limited 
knowledge on the future developments of the day-ahead markets. 
Moreover, multiple years are simulated and therefore also multiple 
investment decisions are taken, which makes it possible to better grasp 
the long-term dynamics of a zonal split. For details on the investment 
planning, see Section 3.5. 
In the subsequent Sections 3.2–3.5, we describe the different deci-
sion levels in more detail. Additionally, Appendix A provides a brief 
general introduction to the models. 
3.2. Zonal configuration and transfer capacities 
As a first step when investigating the impacts of market splitting in 
Germany, we need to carry out an adequate reconfiguration of the 
bidding zone which is both stable and has low intra-zonal congestion. 
Stable in this context means that considering all hours of a base year, the 
final zonal configuration is predominant to other configurations. 
In electricity systems, the nodal price or locational marginal price 
(LMP) of a given grid node represents the marginal cost of delivering an 
additional unit of electricity to this specific node. The LMP includes 
information on both marginal generation costs and the physical aspects 
of the transmission grid. Using the standard objective function of 
minimizing total generation costs, we apply ELMOD to calculate the 
LMP λn at every node n ∈ N which corresponds to the dual variable of 
the energy balance as shown later in Eq. (2). 
If the grid is congested between two nodes, the LMPs of these nodes 
diverge. In contrast, nodes with identical or similar LMPs are typically 
not affected by congestion between each other. These properties of LMPs 
imply that clustering nodes with similar LMPs is a promising approach in 
order to determine stable zones with low intra-zonal congestion. 
Therefore, in order to split the German market area into two bidding 
zones, we apply a fuzzy c-means clustering algorithm (Dunn, 1973; 
Bezdek, 1981; Hong et al., 2002) to the LMPs of all German grid nodes 
over 8760 hours of the base year 2020. 
The major challenge when clustering the LMPs is to avoid 
fragmented zones, meaning that some nodes are clustered in the same 
zone but are not physically connected. A proven solution for similar 
scientific network questions is the application of spatial clustering which 
is based on graph theory (e.g., von Luxburg, 2007). Spatial clustering of 
an electricity network uses a Laplacian matrix L which considers the 
relation between two nodes ni, nj ∈ N as well as lines/edges e ∈ E within 
graph G = (N, E). This procedure has previously been applied by 
Metzdorf (2016). 
After determining the new bidding zone configuration for Germany, 
we calculate the trading capacities between the two bidding zones based 
on the transmission capacities on the border lines of the zones for 2020. 
Thereby, DC-lines are counted at full and AC-lines at one third of their 
capacity to account for uncertainties regarding the state of the grid at a 
given point in time. For the subsequent years, we take into account 
additional capacities on the basis of the network development plans. 
3.3. Day-ahead market simulation 
Splitting the German market area into two price zones has a direct 
impact on the outcomes of the day-ahead markets, both in the short- 
term and the long-term. Using the zonal split determined with 
ELMOD, we can now apply PowerACE to quantify these effects as 
explained hereafter. 
The PowerACE model is structured into different market areas 
m ∈ M, in each of which multiple supply traders, i.e., utility companies, 
are active on the day-ahead market. The simulation of the day-ahead 
market consists of four steps, which are briefly outlined in the following. 
Price forecast. According to the economic theory, market participants 
are willing to sell electricity at their marginal generation costs. 
However, starting up a power plant leads to additional costs due to 
higher fuel consumption and a reduced lifetime caused by material 
stress. In order to account for these costs and prepare bids accordingly, it 
is important for the supply traders to estimate, if and how long a specific 
power plant will be in the market on the following simulation day. Thus, 
in a first step, all supply traders prepare a price forecast for all hours h ∈
H of the following day. The basic approach for this price forecast is an 
extended merit-order model, i.e., a cost-minimal power plant dispatch 
serving the expected hourly residual loads in the respective market area 
is determined under consideration of both variable and start-up costs.1 
The major output of the price forecast are the expected running hours for 
all power plants on the following simulation day. 
Bidding. Using the information from the price forecast, the different 
1 Formally, this step requires to solve a mixed-integer optimization problem. 
However, to save computational resources, a heuristic approach is applied, such 
that only close-to-optimal solutions can be guaranteed. 
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supply traders now prepare bids for all of their own power plants and 
each hour h of the following day. These bids consist of volume (MWh), 
price (EUR/MWh) and type (buy or sell). While the bid volume for each 
power plant is determined considering an exogenously given availability 
factor and a potential obligation to provide balancing power, the bid 
price depends both on the type of the power plant and whether the 
power plant is expected to run in the respective hour or not. An overview 
of the bidding strategies is provided in Appendix B. 
Market clearing. All bids prepared in the previous step are then sub-
mitted to the market coupling operator. In the market clearing process, 
supply and demand bids are matched across all market areas, such that 
welfare is maximized subject to the limited interconnector capacities 
between the different market areas. For a formal description and details 
of the market coupling and clearing, see Ringler et al. (2017). As a result, 
the information, which bids have been partly or fully accepted is 
returned to the different supply traders. 
Dispatch. All supply traders now calculate their individual hourly 
load curve, which is the sum of their hourly bids that have been 
accepted. In the final step of the day-ahead market simulation, the 
different traders determine a cost-minimal dispatch of their individual 
power plant fleet, which serves their hourly load curve under consid-
eration of both variable and start-up costs1. 
3.4. Congestion management 
Using the hourly dispatch of all power plants as obtained from the 
day-ahead market simulation with PowerACE, we can now determine 
the impact of splitting the German market area on the required 
congestion management measures using ELMOD. In the ELMOD version 
applied in this contribution, the congestion management comprises 
redispatching of conventional power plants and curtailment of renew-
able energy production. The integration of these instruments into 
ELMOD is briefly described in the following. 
As shown in Eq. (1), ELMOD has a linear objective function in which 
the total costs of congestion management Ccongtotal across all market areas 











Credispm = total redispatching costs in market area m 
Ccurtm = total curtailment costs in market area m 
The main restriction of ELMOD is the energy balance presented in Eq. 
(2), which needs to be fulfilled at every transmission grid node n and in 
every hour h. Please note:  
• The power plant set Pn at node n comprises subsets for conventional 
power plants Pconn , storage plants P
stor
n and renewable power plants 
Prenn .  
• The gross load lgrossn,h is exogenously set and assumed fully price- 
inelastic.  
• The neighboring countries of Germany are represented with one 








gp,h + f ACn,h + f
DC
n,h ∀n ∈ N, h ∈ H (2)  
where 
lgrossn,h = gross load at node n in hour h 
lchargep,h = storage charging of unit p in hour h (decision variable) 
gp,h = electricity generation of power plant p in hour h (decision 
variable) 
fACn,h = net input of the AC lines at node n in hour h 
fDCn,h = net input of the DC lines at node n in hour h 
The redispatching costs Credispm of all market areas m ∈ M are deter-
mined based on the deviations between the hourly market-dispatched 
power plant generation gmarketp,h with p ∈ P
con
m and the endogenous gen-
eration variables gp,h of ELMOD, which are multiplied by the marginal 









⋅ cvarp ∀m ∈ M (3) 
It is important to note that for computational performance reasons 
start-up costs are considered in the market simulation with PowerACE, 
but not in the grid model ELMOD. Consequently, gmarketp,h could be re- 
optimized without an actual grid congestion need. In order to avoid 
this, Eq. (3) needs to be reformulated such that both positive and 
negative redispatching of conventional power plants are penalized. For 
details on the reformulation, please refer to Appendix C. 
If the redispatching capacities of the conventional power plants are 
not sufficient to find a feasible solution, curtailment of the market- 
dispatched renewable generation gmarketp,h with p ∈ P
ren
m is deployed by 
the model, i.e., gmarketp,h is reduced to gp,h. The differences between g
market
p,h 
and gp,h lead to curtailment costs Ccurtm , which are integrated into ELMOD 
Fig. 1. Timeline of the combined  
application of the models ELMOD and PowerACE (based on a similiar illustration in Ambrosius et al., 2019). 
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⋅ ccurt ∀m ∈ M (4)  
gp,h ≤ gmarketp,h ∀p ∈ P
ren, h ∈ H (5) 
Although most of the grid congestion events can be relieved by 
redispatching and curtailment measures, it is reasonable to use addi-
tional auxiliary variables for dumped load ldumpn,h and artificially added 
load laddn,h to guarantee a feasible solution. For details on the integration of 
these variables, please refer to Appendix C. 
Finally, it is important to mention that the neighboring countries of 
Germany are only represented in a simplified fashion. Therefore, the 
focus of the congestion management measures is on Germany with the 
neighboring countries being used for redispatching only if the German 
power plant capacities are not sufficient (see also Appendix C). 
3.5. Investment planning 
The potential impact on investment incentives is an essential aspect 
when evaluating the long-term efficiency of splitting the German market 
area. For this purpose, the different utility companies modeled as agents 
in PowerACE can perform long-term decisions on investments in new 
conventional power plant and storage capacities at the end of each 
simulation year. Contrary to the common approach of expansion plan-
ning with the objective of minimizing total future system costs, an ac-
tor’s perspective is taken. Consequently, investments are only carried 
out if expected to be profitable by the investor agents. The applied in-
vestment planning algorithm is introduced and described in detail in 
Fraunholz et al. (2019). A brief overview of the basic principles is given 
in the following. 
The decisions of the different investors are primarily based on their 
expectations regarding future electricity prices. As these, vice versa, are 
influenced by the investment decisions of all investors in all inter-
connected market areas, a complex game with multiple possible stra-
tegies opens up. To find a stable outcome for this game, a Nash- 
equilibrium needs to be determined. 
Therefore, the investment planning algorithm terminates when all 
planned investments are profitable and at the same time none of the 
investors is able to improve his expected payoff by carrying out further 
or less investments, i.e., there is no incentive for any investor to 
unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium outcome. The eleven different 
market areas3 are defined as the players interacting with each other and 
the planned investments are then distributed among the investors within 
each market area. This is achieved by first randomizing and then iter-
ating over the different investors after each investment being carried 
out.4 Following this approach, it is possible to consider the mutual 
impact of investments in one market area on the electricity prices and 
consequently investments in the interconnected market areas. 
After the investment planning in PowerACE has been carried out, the 
grid nodes of ELMOD are sorted per market area in descending order 
beginning with the node where most old power plant capacity has been 
decommissioned. The new investments in the respective market area are 
then allocated to the sorted list of grid nodes. Please note that it may also 
occur that more capacity is newly built than decommissioned in a given 
market area. In this case, the ratio between total newly installed capacity 
and total decommissioned capacity in the given zone is computed. The 
installed capacity at each node is then increased by this factor. 
4. Data and scenario setup 
As cross-border effects have a strong impact on the splitting of 
market areas, we model Germany and all neighboring countries plus 
Italy in our analysis. The time horizon covers 2020 through 2050 at 
hourly resolution. While we carry out a continuous simulation over the 
whole time period in PowerACE, we only investigate selected years in 
terms of required congestion management with ELMOD. An overview of 
the model resolutions is provided in Table 1 and further details are 
described in the following. Please note that all (future) prices and costs 
are calculated in real values to exclude the effect of inflation. 
Both models – PowerACE and ELMOD – use consistent data on the 
power plant fleets in the year 2020 which has been compiled using in-
formation from Bundesnetzagentur (2017) for Germany and S&P Global 
Platts (2015) for the other countries. In PowerACE, this data is used on 
unit level for all countries, while ELMOD applies technology aggregated 
data for the neighboring countries. Based on their individual commis-
sioning year, the existing power plants are gradually decommissioned 
over the time horizon until 2050 after reaching the end of their technical 
lifetime. This is exemplary shown on a technology aggregated level for 
the German market area in Fig. 2. In Germany, the phase-out of all 
nuclear power plants until 2022 as well as of all coal-fired power plants 
until 2038 is implemented, following the suggestions of the German 
Kohlekommission (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2019). 
Fossil fuel prices are based on the EU Reference Scenario (European 
Commission, 2016), while the CO2 price development path is taken from 
the same source, yet scaled to reach 150 EUR/tCO2 in 2050. Historical 
electricity demand profiles of 2015 obtained from ENTSO-E (2017) are 
Table 1 
Model resolution of PowerACE and ELMOD.  
Type PowerACE ELMOD 
All countries Germany Other countries 
Temporal resolution 2020–2050 (yearly) at 8760 h/a 2025/2035 at 8760 h/a 
Transmission grid interconnectors full representation aggregated grid nodes 
Conventional power plants unit level unit level technology aggregated 
Electricity demand hourly, market area hourly, grid node hourly, aggregated grid node 
Renewable feed-in hourly, market area hourly, grid node hourly, aggregated grid node  
2 The curtailment costs for renewable generation are an artificial penalty, 
because generation costs are already included in the market dispatch and 
additional costs for the system will only occur for the positive redispatching 
which is needed to balance the system. Nevertheless, these penalty costs can be 
explained by the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) which claims 
priority access to the grid for renewable generation in real time. Furthermore, 
renewable generation is often subsidized by feed-in tariffs or premiums which 
add to the generation costs of the market (Bjørndal et al., 2018). Therefore, the 
curtailment costs of renewable generation ccurt are orientated at the maximum 
penalty costs for negative redispatching in Germany in the respective year. 
Using this approach, curtailment is only carried out if the available redis-
patching capacities are not sufficient to relieve the grid congestion – similarly to 
the real-world process. 
3 Germany in two price zones and all of its neighboring countries plus Italy.  
4 If the investors within each market area are differently parameterized, it 
would also be possible to have the single investors instead of the market areas 
play against each other. However, since the focus of our paper is not on market 
power issues, we choose the more basic approach of defining the market areas 
as players. 
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used and scaled to the yearly demand according to European Commis-
sion (2016). Electricity generation from renewables is based on histor-
ical profiles of 2015 (ENTSO-E, 2017), which are scaled such that an 
overall renewable share in relation to electricity demand of 80% in 2050 
is reached. Fig. 3 illustrates the assumed composition of the renewable 
electricity generation in Germany as well as the total yearly gross 
electricity demand.5 Despite the potential impact of market splitting on 
regional incentives to flexibilize load, demand side management is out 
of the scope of this paper and not taken into account. 
In ELMOD, the transmission grid is modeled on a nodal level for 
Germany while aggregated artificial grid nodes are defined for the 
neighboring countries (see Fig. 4). Future grid extension is based on the 
Ten-Year Network Development Plan (ENTSO-E, 2016). However, given 
the current status of the different HVDC projects in Germany, we assume 
a delay of five years compared to the official plans. 
For the German market area, the power plant fleet, hourly renewable 
feed-in and hourly electricity demand are regionalized and then 
assigned to the respective grid nodes in ELMOD. The regionalization of 
renewable power plants is based on data from Bundesnetzagentur 
(2019). For the electricity demand, a load share for each node is 
calculated based on gross domestic product and population per NUTS-3 
area. Please note that the shares of renewable feed-in by technology and 
electricity demand at each node are assumed constant over the whole 
simulation period, i.e., today’s yearly generation and demand are scaled 
to the respective future values. 
For the day-ahead market simulation in PowerACE, the exchange of 
electricity between Germany and its neighboring countries is limited by 
fixed maximum transfer capacities obtained from ENTSO-E (2016), 
while – similarly to the real-world market clearing process – intra-zonal 
grid constraints are not considered. 
The agents in PowerACE can invest in different conventional power 
plants as well as utility-scale storage technologies. An overview of these 
investment options with their respective techno-economic characteris-
tics is provided in Appendix D. Accounting for the political situation in 
the different market areas, investments in lignite- or coal-fired power 
plants are only eligible in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
In order to analyze the long-term impacts of splitting the German 
price zone, two different scenarios need to be investigated. Table 2 
summarizes the main characteristics of these scenarios. In scenario REF, 
which serves as a benchmark, the German market area consists of only 
one countrywide price zone (DE). Consequently, no intra-zonal 
transmission grid constraints are considered in the day-ahead market 
simulation with PowerACE. However, these constraints become relevant 
in the subsequent step, when calculating the required congestion man-
agement measures in ELMOD based on the market outcome of Power-
ACE. Contrary, in scenario SPLIT, a division of the German market area in 
a Northern price zone (DEN) and a Southern price zone (DES) is 
Fig. 2. Assumed conventional power plant capacities in Germany without 
additional new investments (Bundesnetzagentur, 2017, and own assumptions). 
Abbreviations: CCGT—combined cycle gas turbine, OCGT—open cycle 
gas turbine. 
Fig. 3. Assumed annual renewable electricity generation and gross electricity 
demand in Germany (European Commission, 2016, and own assumptions). 
Fig. 4. Simulated market areas and corresponding level of detail of the 
grid model. 
5 In reality, driven by sector coupling, the electricity demand may increase 
much stronger than we assumed. This is particularly true in the period after 
2040. However, the grid would then likely also be further extended. Since no 
data on grid extension after 2035 is currently publicly available, we use rela-
tively conservative assumptions regarding demand growth and renewable 
expansion. In future research, more ambitious scenarios should therefore also 
be investigated. 
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investigated. 
The splitting of the German market area is assumed to take place in 
2020. In order to implement the market splitting, we apply a limited 
static transfer capacity between the two German price zones for the day- 
ahead market simulation in PowerACE. This transmission limit is 
adjusted over time to account for grid extension within Germany (see 
Section 5.1). For the calculation of required congestion management in 
ELMOD, we consider the full German transmission grid in the same way 
as for the scenario REF. 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Zonal configuration and transfer capacities 
Before delving into the long-term impacts of splitting the German 
market area, let us start with a brief look at the zonal delimination 
resulting from the clustering of nodal prices (Fig. 5). While the region-
alized electricity demand (cf. Section 4) is split roughly evenly between 
DEN and DES, we can see that the majority of conventional power 
plants, in particular lignite-fired capacities with low variable costs, is 
located in DEN. Regarding renewable electricity generation, we can 
state that solar is split evenly, whereas wind power is predominantly 
located in DEN and hydro power in DES. For details, please refer to 
Table 3. 
In Table 4 we show the corresponding assumed total net transfer 
capacities, which are an important driver for the day-ahead market 
simulation and generation expansion planning. We calculate the ca-
pacities based on the transmission capacities on the border lines of the 
zones in the respective year as described in Section 3.2. As previously 
mentioned, we assume a delay of five years for the different HVDC 
projects compared to the official plans. 
5.2. Day-ahead market impacts 
Let us now move on to the short-term and long-term day-ahead 
market impacts of splitting the German market area. 
We can see that in both scenarios REF and SPLIT, the average day- 
ahead prices p in Germany increase significantly throughout the simu-
lation period despite the high shares of renewable electricity generation 
(Fig. 6a). This trend can mainly be attributed to the assumed strong 
increase in CO2 prices, more frequent and costly start-ups of conven-
tional power plants as well as some scarcity hours with prices of 3000 
EUR/MWhel. 
In order to isolate the price impact resulting from the split of the 
German market area, we transform the mean prices p to relative price 
differences for further analysis (Fig. 6b). For this purpose, we define the 
German mean day-ahead price in scenario REF as a reference and then 
compute the relative price differences Δps,m in scenario s and market 
area m as Δps,m = ps,m/pREF,DE − 100%. Consequently, by definition, the 
relative price differences of REF–DE are always at 0% throughout the 
simulation period. 
We can see from Fig. 6b that initially, in 2020, the average prices in 
DEN are only around 2% (corresponds to 0.87 EUR/MWhel) lower, but 
those in DES almost 16% (7.23 EUR/MWhel) higher than in the single 
German price zone.6 Between 2020 and 2035, the relative price 
Table 2 
Overview of the investigated scenarios.  






REF one countrywide 
price zone (DE) 
no consideration of any 
intra-zonal transmission 
grid constraints 
consideration of intra- 
zonal transmission 
grid constraints 
SPLIT two price zones 
(DEN/DES) 
limited static transfer 
capacity between 
German price zones 
consideration of intra- 
zonal transmission 
grid constraints  
Fig. 5. Optimal delimination of the German bidding zone resulting from the 
clustering of nodal prices. 
Table 3 
Conventional power plant capacity, renewable feed-in and electricity demand in 
Germany for the base year 2020 and the respective shares in DEN and DES as 
resulting from the bidding zone delimination (Bundesnetzagentur, 2017; Euro-
pean Commission, 2016; and own assumptions/calculations). Abbreviations: 
CCGT—combined cycle gas turbine, OCGT—open cycle gas turbine.  






Nuclear 8.1 GW 51% 49% 
Lignite 14.7 GW 98% 2% 
Coal 21.0 GW 63% 37% 
CCGT 14.2 GW 71% 29% 
OCGT 8.3 GW 72% 28% 
Oil 2.7 GW 82% 18% 
Pumped storage 6.4 GW 38% 62% 
Biomass 33.9 TWh 64% 36% 
Hydro 22.5 TWh 20% 80% 
Solar 48.5 TWh 49% 51% 
Wind onshore 78.2 TWh 87% 13% 
Wind offshore 31.3 TWh 100% 0% 
Electricity 
demand 
530.3 TWh 58% 42%  
6 These price differences between the two German price zones are higher 
than those found in the literature (cf. Section 2). However, previous studies are 
difficult to compare to ours due to varying scenario years and substantially 
different assumptions, e.g., regarding the power plant fleets. In additional 
sensitivities with higher (lower) net transfer capacities of 10 GW (6 GW), we 
find the price differences to decrease (increase) to 4.96 EUR/MWhel (12.37 
EUR/MWhel). These results stand well in line with those of Plancke et al. 
(2016). Splitting the German market area already in 2015 instead of 2020, we 
obtain an average price difference of 2.35 EUR/MWhel, which is comparable to 
that found by Egerer et al. (2016) for 2015 (1.70 EUR/MWhel). 
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differences between DEN and DES continuously decline, which is mainly 
driven by the grid extension and the resulting increase in transfer ca-
pacities between the two German price zones (cf. Table 4). However, 
due to the ongoing strong expansion of renewables (cf. Fig. 3) and no 
additional grid extension after 2035, the relative price differences rise 
again slightly in the second part of the simulation period (2035–2050). 
This result is also reflected in Fig. 7 showing the sorted hourly price 
differences between DES and DEN. While the share of hours with posi-
tive price differences (i.e., higher prices in DES than in DEN) declines 
strongly from around 40% to less than 10% between 2020 and 2035, 
their absolute magnitude increases sharply between 2035 and 2050. The 
reasons for this finding are twofold. Firstly, towards 2050, renewables 
are increasingly often price-setting in DEN with their marginal cost of 
0 EUR/MWhel, while conventional capacity is still needed in DES due to 
a lack of transmission capacity between the two German price zones. 
Secondly, the general level of the day-ahead prices rises strongly over 
the course of the simulation as previously explained. Situations with 
higher prices in DEN than in DES occur in well below 1% of the hours 
throughout the simulation period and are therefore not further 
discussed. 
Fig. 6b also illustrates that in the medium to long term, the price level 
in both DEN and DES is slightly higher than in REF–DE. Given the 
completely different setup regarding location of (new) power plants 
(discussed below, cf. Fig. 8), grid extension (cf. Table 4) and renewable 
expansion (cf. Fig. 3) as compared to the base year 2020, the assumed 
zonal configuration has become outdated by 2035. Moreover, the 
limited transfer capacity between the two German price zones leads to a 
less efficient market outcome than under a single German price zone. 
The major reason for this finding is that the additional restrictions at the 
market clearing stage lead to more electricity generation by peak load 
units with high variable costs, while at the same time the market-based 
curtailment of renewables with zero variable costs increases under a 
zonal split (discussed in Section 5.3, cf. Fig. 9c). 
The bidding zone delimination and the related price divergence be-
tween DEN and DES also has an impact on the respective investment 
incentives for conventional power plants and utility-scale storage units.7 
In Fig. 8, the simulated development of the conventional power plant 
and utility-scale storage capacities in the two prices zones DEN and DES 
is depicted for both scenarios REF and SPLIT.8 
As compared to scenario REF, significantly more investments are 
carried out in the price zone DES in scenario SPLIT, while the opposite is 
true for the price zone DEN. This is a direct outcome of the investment 
planning module presented in Section 3.5. Due to the higher electricity 
price forecasts in DES, investments in DES are often preferred over DEN 
in scenario SPLIT. Contrary, in scenario REF, new power plants are 
distributed equally between DEN and DES. 
The generally slightly higher price level in scenario SPLIT also leads 
Table 4 
New high-voltage direct current (HVDC) lines and assumed total net transfer 
capacity (NTC) of all lines between DEN and DES (both directions) in scenario 
SPLIT (ENTSO-E, 2016, and own assumptions).  
Years New HVDC lines Total NTC 
2020–2026 Ultranet 8 GW 
2027–2028 Suedlink 12 GW 
2029 SuedOstLink 14 GW 
2030–2034 A-North 16 GW 
2035–2050 DC21/DC23 18 GW  
Fig. 6. Simulated development of the day-ahead prices (real values) in absolute (a) and relative (b) terms for both scenarios REF and SPLIT.  
Fig. 7. Simulated sorted day-ahead price differences (real values) between DES 
and DEN in scenario SPLIT. 
7 The expansion of renewable generation capacities is not modeled endoge-
nously, instead the renewable feed-in is based on exogenously defined hourly 
profiles (see Section 4).  
8 In scenario REF, new capacities in Germany are distributed evenly between 
the two zones DEN and DES to allow for a comparison with scenario SPLIT. 
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to the cumulated new capacity across both price zones being a bit higher 
than in scenario REF. Moreover, while storage investments are not 
profitable in scenario REF, some investments in these technologies are 
carried out in scenario SPLIT and price zone DEN. Given the high 
amount of renewable electricity generation in DEN as well as the limited 
transfer capacities to DES in scenario SPLIT, this finding is quite 
straightforward. 
5.3. Congestion management 
The day-ahead market results described in the previous section have 
an immediate impact on the required congestion management measures. 
The volumes of these measures are presented by category and for both 
scenarios REF and SPLIT in Fig. 9. 
We can see that in 2025 the redispatching volumes decrease as a 
result of the zonal split (Fig. 9a). More specifically, by considering po-
tential grid congestion between DEN and DES already at the market 
clearing stage, negative redispatching in DEN and positive redispatching 
in DES can be reduced. However, as discussed before, the different setup 
as compared to the base year 2020 leads to the assumed zonal config-
uration becoming outdated by 2035, which ultimately causes an in-
crease of positive redispatching volumes in DES. 
As expected, splitting the German market area leads to a reduction of 
grid-related curtailment in both 2025 and 2035 (Fig. 9b). This is 
Fig. 8. Simulated development of the conventional power plant and utility-scale storage capacities in Germany for both scenarios REF and SPLIT. Abbreviations: 
CCGT—combined cycle gas turbine, OCGT—open cycle gas turbine. 
Fig. 9. Required congestion management measures by category for both scenarios REF and SPLIT. As is common practice, the gross congestion volume (d) is 
calculated as the absolute sum of categories (a)–(c). 
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particularly relevant for DEN due to the large amount of wind power 
installed. However, the positive effect is overcompensated in 2035 by 
additional market-related curtailment (Fig. 9c), which results from the 
strong increase in renewable electricity generation and the limited net 
transfer capacities between DEN and DES. In consequence, we can 
observe a negative total effect of the market splitting on required 
curtailment of renewables in 2035. 
Summing up redispatching and curtailment measures, we end up 
with the gross congestion volume9 (Fig. 9d), which decreases under a 
zonal split in 2025, yet increases in 2035 due to the outdated and 
therefore inadequate zonal configuration. These finding shows that 
policymakers and regulators should regularly re-assess and potentially 
adjust bidding zone configurations. 
5.4. System costs and distributional effects 
Using the results from Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we can now derive a 
number of economic indicators, which are summarized in Table 5. A 
brief description of our major findings is provided in the following. 
The price differences between DEN and DES (cf. Fig. 6b) lead to a 
decrease of the wholesale costs of electricity generation in DEN and an 
increase in DES (2025) under a zonal split, before increasing in both 
DEN and DES (2035). In contrast, volumes and costs of redispatching are 
lower for scenario SPLIT in 2025, but then rise in 2035 since the pre-
viously optimal zonal configuration has become outdated for several 
reasons, as mentioned before. In consequence, we find the total system 
costs to be higher in both 2025 and 2035 if the German market area is 
split into two zones. 
Since we have assumed the electricity demand to be completely 
static, the increase in system costs is identical with the reduction of the 
consumer rents. In scenario SPLIT, producers in DES benefit from higher 
prices as compared to scenario REF. Thus, the producer rents in DES 
increase in 2025, while the opposite is true for DEN, in total leading to a 
reduction of the producer rents. In 2035, a substantial increase of the 
producer rents in DES can be observed due to the preferred allocation of 
new generation capacity in DES as well as higher prices as compared to 
scenario REF. In DEN, a lot less generation capacity is installed in sce-
nario SPLIT, leading to a decrease of the producer rents. Since the effect 
in DES is much stronger than in DEN, we find an overall increase of the 
producer rents in Germany in 2035. 
Apart from affecting the system costs, the price differences between 
DEN and DES also lead to higher congestion rents under a zonal split. 
Since the prices in both zones converge to a certain extent (cf. Fig. 6b), 
this effect is less pronounced in 2035 than 2025. 
We can ultimately conclude that splitting the German market area in 
two zones has strong distributional effects. DES benefits from a signifi-
cant increase of the producer rents, which overcompensates the corre-
sponding reduction of the consumer rents, resulting in a positive welfare 
effect. Yet, the opposite effect occurs in DEN. Overall, we find a negative 
welfare effect for Germany. Finally, it is important to mention that we 
take a purely German perspective in our analysis, while other neigh-
boring countries may benefit from a German market splitting. However, 
given our simplified representation of the neighboring countries, we are 
unable to derive profound results in this regard. 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
Using an innovative modeling framework consisting of an agent- 
based electricity market simulation model (PowerACE) and an optimal 
power flow model (ELMOD) we investigated the long-term impacts of 
splitting the German price zone in a multi-period setting with different 
decision levels. We found strong impacts of a market splitting on day- 
ahead electricity prices, investment planning of generation companies, 
required congestion management and, ultimately, system costs and so-
cial welfare. 
After splitting the German market area into a Northern price zone 
(DEN) and a Southern price zone (DES) in 2020, the day-ahead prices in 
both zones initially diverge significantly with higher prices in DES and 
lower prices in DEN. The price differences then decline between 2020 
and 2035, which is mainly driven by grid extension, and rise again 
slightly between 2035 and 2050 due to the ongoing strong expansion of 
renewables without additional grid extension. Since the limited transfer 
capacity between the two German price zones leads to a less efficient 
market outcome, we found the price level in both DEN and DES to be 
slightly higher than under a single German price zone in the medium to 
long term. 
The higher electricity prices in DES than DEN also have an imme-
diate impact on investment incentives, leading to much more new power 
plants being built in DES than DEN as compared to the reference case of 
a single German price zone. 
The required congestion management decreases in 2025 under a 
zonal split, however, we found it to be higher in 2035, since the bidding 
zone delimination has become outdated given the completely different 
setup regarding location of (new) power plants, grid extension and 
renewable expansion as compared to the base year 2020. 
These results are also reflected in system costs, which rise under a 
zonal split in both 2025 and 2035, mainly due to significantly higher 
wholesale prices for electricity. In terms of social welfare, the generation 
companies in DES benefit from substantial increases in producer rents, 
which overcompensate the reduction of consumer rents. In contrast, the 
generation companies in DEN suffer from lower producer rents (mainly 
2025), which are then supplemented by a strong decrease in consumer 
rents in 2035. Overall, we found a negative welfare effect in Germany 
under a zonal split. However, it is important to mention that we took a 
purely German perspective in our analysis, while other neighboring 
countries may benefit from the German market splitting. 
Our findings are particularly crucial for policymakers and regulators 
in the field of electricity market design, but also for generation com-
panies and grid operators. Optimization approaches with perfect antic-
ipation of future decisions by different players as previously applied in 
the literature typically lead to positive welfare effects of market split-
ting. This is rather straightforward, given the perfect foresight and 
single-period character of these models. In contrast, our multi-period 
approach with imperfect information of the different players showed 
that a zonal delimination optimal from today’s perspective may become 
outdated over time in a dynamic environment with grid extension, 
renewable expansion and investments in new power plants. 
Therefore, we recommend that policymakers and regulators should 
regularly re-assess and potentially adjust bidding zone configurations. 
However, one major objective of price zones is to provide locational 
investment incentives. These would be reduced, if investors could not 
rely on stable price zones. In consequence, adequately setting up stable 
bidding zones remains a major challenge, which is reflected by most of 
the European electricity market still being organized in countrywide 
price zones. Importantly, our results are not only valid for Germany, but 
also highly relevant for any other region using multiple price zones 
within a country, such as the Nordic electricity market or Italy. 
We are well aware that despite providing important insights on the 
long-term impacts of splitting price zones, our work could be substan-
tially extended to get a more complete picture on this issue. Regarding 
the day-ahead market simulation, much depends on the appropriate 
choice of the transfer capacities between the different zones, which is a 
difficult task. In reality, flow-based market coupling is already in place 
in Central Western Europe, which automatically accounts for and at 
least partly solves this issue. Our day-ahead market simulation could 
therefore be extended to a flow-based market coupling approach. 
Moreover, we have assumed exogenous expansion of renewables. 
9 Please note that it is common practice to count all congestion management 
measures in positive terms, i.e., also negative redispatching contributes to an 
increase of the gross congestion volume. 
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However, the different electricity price levels in DES and DEN might not 
only affect investments in conventional power plants, but also lead to 
more renewables being placed in Southern Germany despite better wind 
locations in Northern Germany. Our approach could therefore also be 
extended in this direction and account for model-endogenous renewable 
expansion. The same applies for the electricity demand, which we have 
assumed to be exogenously given and fully static. Yet, market splitting 
and the related price differences might create regional incentives to 
flexibilize load. 
In future research, it would also be possible to use a more detailed 
representation of the grid in the German neighboring countries than we 
did in our paper. Like this, the welfare effects in all these countries could 
be investigated rather than only in Germany. Such an analysis would 
likely bring interesting insights on why Germany is reluctant to split its 
market area, while some neighboring countries are rather in favor of this 
measure. 
Lastly, we have assumed the regulator to decide on the zonal 
delimination based purely on information available to him at the time of 
decision-making. Alternatively, some kind of iterative procedure could 
be implemented, in which the regulator tries to anticipate the future 
status of the electricity system and the behavior of the market partici-
pants as a result of his zonal split. The regulator could then adjust the 
initial zonal delimination accordingly. Carrying out this iteration mul-
tiple times, we would then likely end up with similar results as in the 
literature, where perfect anticipation of future decisions is often 
assumed. However, given the high degree of uncertainty that a regulator 
deciding on a zonal delimination is confronted with, we expect our re-
sults to be closer to the real-world setting than models with perfect 
anticipation of all players’ decisions. 
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A. Model descriptions 
A.1. Optimal power flow model ELMOD 
ELMOD is a linear optimization model for the analysis of interactions between electricity generation and transmission grid. Originally developed at 
TU Dresden (Leuthold et al., 2008), ELMOD has already been used for numerous system analyses (e.g., Kunz et al., 2011; Kunz, 2013). In ELMOD, the 
European transmission grid as well as power plants and electricity demand are regionally modeled on a grid node level. The load flow is approximated 
by a direct current (DC) approach. The objective of the standard model version is to minimize total generation costs. In this contribution, however, 
costs for congestion management are minimized instead, since the electricity generation of the different power plants results from the market 
simulation with PowerACE and is an exogenous input for ELMOD. The constraints of ELMOD include maintaining the energy balance for each point in 
time and grid node as well as further equations regarding restrictions of the load flow and the dispatch of generation and storage units. An overview of 
the detailed mathematical formulations can be found in Leuthold et al. (2012). ELMOD is formulated in the General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS) and solved with the commercial CPLEX solver. 
A.2. Electricity market simulation model PowerACE 
The agent-based simulation model PowerACE has been developed at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and has already been applied for various 
energy system analyses (e.g., Bublitz et al., 2017; Genoese, 2010; Keles et al., 2016; Ringler et al., 2017). In PowerACE, major wholesale electricity 
markets and the associated market participants such as utility companies, regulators and consumers are modeled. The agents representing electricity 
suppliers can decide on the daily scheduling of their power plants and storage units as well as on the construction of new power plants and utility-scale 
storages. Thus, the short-term and long-term decision levels are considered jointly and their interactions can be investigated. Ultimately, the 
development of the markets emerges from the simulated behavior of all agents. 
B. Day-ahead market simulation 
The different supply traders prepare bids bp,h for all of their own power plants p and each hour h of the following simulation day. The respective bid 
Table 5 
Effects of the market splitting on economic indicators in Germany in million EUR (real values). All values show the respective deltas between the scenarios SPLIT and 
REF.  
ID/Calculation Indicator Year 2025 [106 EUR] Year 2035 [106 EUR] 
DEN DES DEN + DES DEN DES DEN + DES 
A Δ Wholesale costs  − 308  + 1440  + 1132  + 1732  + 1735  + 3467  
B Δ Redispatching costs  + 243  − 360  − 117  + 10  + 88  + 98  
C = A+ B  Δ System costs  − 65  + 1080  + 1015  + 1742  + 1824  + 3566  
D = − C  Δ Consumer rents  + 65  − 1080  − 1015  − 1742  − 1824  − 3566  
E Δ Producer rents  − 1207  + 1115  − 92  − 280  + 2093  + 1813  
F Δ Congestion rents  + 298  + 380  + 677  + 198  + 180  + 378  
G = D+ E+ F  Δ Total welfare  − 844  + 414  − 430  − 1824  + 450  − 1374   
C. Fraunholz et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Energy Policy 149 (2021) 111833
13
price depends both on the type of the power plant and whether the power plant is expected to run in the respective hour (i.e., h ∈ Honp ⊆ H) or expected 
not to run (i.e., h ∈ Hoffp ⊆H). All bidding prices for the different cases are briefly described in the following and formally summarized in Table 6.  
Table 6 
Overview of power plants’ hourly bidding prices bp,h depending on the type of the power plant and the ex-
pected online hours.  
Case (1): Power plant p (base-/medium-/peak-load) is in the market in all hours h  
bp,h = cvarp  ∀h ∈ H
on
p = H  
Case (2): Power plant p (base-load) is in the market in some hours h  
bp,h = cvarp  ∀h ∈ H
on
p ⊆H   
bminp,h = c
var
p − cstartp /toffp  ∀h ∈ Hoffp ⊆H   
brestp,h = c
var
p  ∀h ∈ Hoffp ⊆H  
Case (3): Power plant p (medium-/peak-load) is in the market in some hours h  
bp,h = cvarp + cstartp /tonp  ∀h ∈ H
on
p ⊆H   
bp,h = cvarp + cstartp /Δt  ∀h ∈ Hoffp ⊆H   
Case (1). If a power plant of any type (base-, medium- or peak-load) is expected to be in the market in all hours, i.e., Honp = H, the hourly bids bp,h 
only consist of the variable costs cvarp , which are determined by the fuel price pfuelp , the power plant’s net electrical efficiency ηp, the price of CO2 
emission allowances pCO2 , the CO2 emission factor of the fuel efuel and the costs for operation and maintenance cO&Mp as shown in Eq. (6). 
cvarp =
pfuelp + pCO2 ⋅efuel
ηp
+ cO&Mp (6) 
Case (2). If a base-load power plant is expected to be in the market only in some hours or never, i.e., Hoffp ∕= ∅, variable costs are bid for the expected 
running hours Honp and two different bids are created for each hour h ∈ H
off
p – the minimum running load of the power plant is bid at variable costs 
minus avoided start-up costs cstartp , while the remaining load is bid at variable costs. The avoided start-up costs are evenly distributed among the 
expected offline time toffp . The economic reasoning behind this strategy is, that base-load power plants are expected to temporarily accept market prices 
below their marginal generation costs in order to avoid start-up costs in subsequent hours. 
Case (3). If a medium- or peak-load power plant is expected to be in the market only in some hours or never, the hourly bids consist of variable costs 
and start-up costs. If the online time tonp is longer than one hour, start-up costs are distributed evenly. 
Further price-inelastic bids for demand, renewable feed-in and pumped storage units are prepared by a single trader per market area, respectively. 
For details on the determination of the bid volumes for pumped storage plants, please refer to Fraunholz et al. (2017). 
C. Congestion management 
For computational performance reasons start-up costs are considered in the market simulation with PowerACE, but not in the grid model ELMOD. 
Consequently, redispatching might be carried out without an actual grid congestion need. In the following, we describe how this issue can be avoided 
by reformulating Eq. (3). Thereby, the following crucial conditions need to be satisfied:  
• Both, positive and negative redispatching have to be penalized to avoid redispatching without a grid congestion need.  
• Positive redispatching should be carried out with the lowest-variable-cost power plants able to resolve the grid congestion.  
• Negative redispatching should be carried out with the highest-variable-cost power plants running according to the day-ahead market outcome.  
• Redispatching measures should preferably be carried out within Germany rather than in neighboring countries. 
As a first step, we define the reverted variable costs cvar,revp of a German conventional power plant p ∈ P
con
DE as shown in Eq. (7), where c
var
DE denotes 






⋅ cvarDE ∀p ∈ P
con
DE (7) 
We can now calculate the total costs for redispatching in Germany CredispDE according to Eq. (8). In this formulation, positive redispatching is 
penalized with the respective variable costs, whereas negative redispatching is penalized with the respective reverted variable costs. Like this, cost- 









gp,h − gmarketp,h , 0
)
⋅ cvarp − min
(





As previously mentioned, the neighboring countries of Germany are considered via interconnectors and aggregated auxiliary grid nodes. More-
over, the focus of this analysis is on the congestion management capabilities of Germany. For these reasons, contrary to redispatching in Germany, 
both positive and negative redispatching in neighboring countries are penalized at the maximum variable costs of the German conventional power 
plants cvar,maxDE = maxp∈PconDE c
var











⃒⋅cvar,maxDE ∀m ∈ M\{DE} (9) 
In reality, if a power plant has to conduct negative redispatching, the saved marginal costs have to be payed back to the TSO. To account for this 
practice, the final redispatching costs are determined by subtracting the artificial negative redispatching costs from the positive redispatching costs 
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subsequently to the cost minimization with ELMOD. 
Although most of the grid congestion events can be relieved by redispatching and curtailment measures, situations in which the load cannot be 
served by the available generation units under grid restrictions may occur. In these cases, part of the load can be dumped through ldumpn,h at a high 
penalty of cvoll = 10 000 EUR/MWhel
10. Contrary, the artificially added load laddn,h is implemented for modelling reasons only in order to ensure a 
feasible solution and is also strongly penalized with specific costs of cadd = 10 000 EUR/MWhel. If laddn,h volumes arise, it may reveal model failures. 
Both penalty costs sum up to Cinfm as shown in Eq. (10). The objective function of ELMOD as introduced in Eq. (1) now needs to be extended to the 







cadd ⋅ laddn,h + c
voll ⋅ ldumpn,h
)






















gp,h + f ACn,h + f
DC
n,h ∀n ∈ N, h ∈ H (12)  
D. Input data 
An overview of the techno-economic characteristics of the different investment options modeled in PowerACE is provided in Tables 7 and 8.  
Table 7 
Conventional power plant investment options modeled in PowerACE with their respective techno-economic characteristics (Schröder et al., 2013; Louwen et al., 2018, 
and own assumptions).  
Technology Block size CCS Net efficiencya Lifetime Building time Specific investment (2015–2050)a O&M costs fixed O&M costs var.b 
[MWel]  [%] [a] [a] [EUR/kWel]  [EUR/kWela]  [EUR/MWhel] 
Coal 600 no 45–48 40 4 1800 60 6   
yes 36–41   3143–2677  30 
Lignite 800 no 43–47 40 4 1500 30 7   
yes 30–33   3840–3324  34 
CCGT 400 no 60–62 30 4 800 20 5   
yes 49–52   1216–1078  18 
OCGT 400 no 40–42 30 2 400 15 3 
Abbreviations: CCGT—combined cycle gas turbine, CCS—carbon capture and storage, OCGT—open cycle gas turbine, O&M—operation and maintenance. 
a Resulting from technological learning, the net efficiency is assumed to increase over time. Since conventional power plants can generally be regarded as mature 
technologies, it is further assumed that only the specific investments of the CCS-technologies are declining. 
b Including variable costs for carbon capture, transport and storage, where applicable.  
Table 8 
Electricity storage investment options modeled in PowerACE with their respective techno-economic characteristics (Louwen et al., 2018; Siemens Gamesa, 2019, and 
own assumptions).  
Technology Block size Storage capacitya Round-trip efficiencyb Lifetimeb Building time Specific investment (2015–2050)b O&M costs fixedb 







Li-ion battery 300 1200 85–95 20–30 2 3149–572 63–11   
3000    7643–1388 153–28 
RF battery 300 3000 75–85 20–30 2 4206–892 84–18 
A-CAES 300 3000 60–75 30 2 1095 22 
ETES 300 1200 50–60 40 2 600 12   
3000    672 13 
Abbreviations: A-CAES—adiabatic compressed air energy storage, ETES—electric thermal energy storage, O&M—operation and maintenance, RF battery—redox-flow 
battery. 
a For RF batteries and A-CAES, a substantial share of the investment expenses is related to the converter units. Consequently, for economic reasons, only higher 
storage capacities of 3000 MWhel are eligible as investment options for these technologies. 
b Resulting from technological learning, round-trip efficiency and lifetime are assumed to increase over time for the emerging storage technologies. Analogously, 
specific investments and fixed costs for O&M are assumed to decline. 
10 The Value of Lost Load (VoLL) is defined as the willingness to pay of electricity consumers to avoid a disruption of their electricity supply. The determination of 
the VoLL is non-trivial and depends on several customer-specific factors as well as the respective point in time. Therefore, we assume an average value, which is 
chosen high enough to only consider load shedding as a last resort when carrying out congestion management. 
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